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Not all ￿rms export every period. Firms enter and exit foreign markets. Previous research has
suggested that these export participation decisions have signi￿cant aggregate implications. In par-
ticular, it has been argued that these export decisions are important for the comovements of net
exports and the real exchange rate. In this paper, we evaluate these predictions in a general equilib-
rium environment. Speci￿cally, assuming that ￿rms face an up-front, sunk cost of entering foreign
markets and a smaller period-by-period continuation cost, we derive the discrete entry and exit
decisions yielding exporter dynamics in an otherwise standard equilibrium open economy business
cycle model. We show that the export decisions of ￿rms in the model are in￿ uenced by the business
cycle in a manner consistent with evidence presented for U.S. exporters. However, in contrast to
previous partial equilibrium analyses, model results reveal that the aggregate e⁄ects of these export
decisions are negligible.
JEL classi￿cations: E31, F12. Keywords: Net Exports, Real Exchange Rate, Exporters.
11. Introduction
Recent studies have emphasized the importance of the entry and exit decisions of ￿rms into
foreign markets for net export and real exchange rate dynamics. This paper revisits this idea,
extending the analysis to a general equilibrium environment. Speci￿cally, we embed a model of
establishment export dynamics into an equilibrium open economy business cycle model. Individual
￿rms face a large, up-front sunk cost of entering a foreign market and a smaller, period-by-period
cost of continuing in the foreign market. In the presence of idiosyncratic technology shocks, non-
exporting ￿rms start exporting only when the expected value of exporting covers the entry costs.
Exporters continue to export as long as the value of doing so exceeds the continuation cost. Owing
to heterogeneity in productivity, the value of entering the foreign market varies across nonexporters
and the value of continuing in the foreign market varies across exporters. These values change over
time so that the model generates a time-varying distribution of exporters and nonexporters.
The model is consistent with several empirical regularities documented in recent studies. First,
most ￿rms do not export. For example, among the U.S. manufacturing plants in the 1992 Census of
Manufactures, Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, and Kortum (2003) report that only 21 percent of the plants
actually export. Second, export decisions are quite persistent. For instance, in a balanced panel
of manufacturing plants in the Annual Survey of Manufactures from the Longitudinal Research
Database (LRD), over the period from 1984 to 1992, on average each year 87.4 percent of the
exporters continued exporting in the following year and 86.1 percent of nonexporters did not export
in the following year. Finally, exporters tend to be both bigger in terms of shipments, employees
and capital, and more productive than nonexporters. Using the same data, Bernard and Jensen
(1999a) ￿nd that U.S. exporters are 12 percent to 18 percent more productive, employ 77 percent
to 95 percent more workers, use 13 percent to 20 percent more capital per worker, and produce 104
percent to 115 percent more output than nonexporters.1
1The LRD is not a representative sample of manufacturing ￿rms but is biased toward larger ￿rms. Consequently,
2A general theme running through the recent literature is that these export decisions have
important implications for the dynamics of net exports. In particular, in a series of papers Baldwin
(1988), Baldwin and Krugman (1989), and Dixit (1989a,b) develop partial equilibrium models of
export decisions with sunk costs. They show that following a depreciation of the domestic real
exchange rate, the sunk costs aspect of the export decisions lead foreign ￿rms to continue serving
the domestic market even though their goods may have become relatively more expensive. This
idea, termed exporter hysteresis, is argued to have contributed to the dynamics of the U.S. net
exports and real exchange rate in the mid to late 1980s. During this period, net exports declined as
the real exchange rate depreciated and only started to increase with a lag of about two years. More
generally, beyond this episode, these sunk costs are thought to contribute to the slow response of
net exports to changes in the real exchange rate.
Our model of establishment dynamics contains the main feature leading to exporter hysteresis,
sunk costs of exporting. The results contrast those in the previous literature. In particular, when
business cycles are assumed to originate from exogenous shocks to aggregate productivity in each
country, we ￿nd that export participation decisions do not noticeably alter the dynamics of the
real exchange rate or net exports. Their properties are strikingly similar to those of the standard
international business cycle model in Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland (1994). In that model, a positive
innovation to productivity in one country leads its real exchange rate to depreciate and net exports to
decline. Net exports then move into surplus with a delay of 5 quarters. These dynamics are governed
by the familiar capital accumulation motive during an economic expansion in the standard model.
We ￿nd that introducing export decisions does not noticeably increase this delay.
Our results are robust across a wide range of parameterizations that generate reasonable co-
movements in economic activity across countries. The model generates business cycles close to the
data only when goods from di⁄erent countries are relatively poor substitutes compared to goods
this database tends to understate the di⁄erences between exporters and non-exporters compared to the Census of
Manufactures.
3from the same country. When goods from the same country are fairly close substitutes, the total
quantity imported depends very little on the number of di⁄erent goods available. Demand for im-
ports can be satis￿ed by purchasing many goods from a few di⁄erent suppliers or a few goods from
many di⁄erent suppliers. Thus, the number of exporters, and hence foreign products, generally does
not matter for aggregate trade dynamics for most reasonable parameterizations. That we ￿nd small
aggregate implications of non-convexities in exporting is similar to the ￿ndings of Thomas (2002)
and Veracierto (2003) regarding non-convexities in investment for aggregate dynamics.
We do ￿nd that the business cycle a⁄ects when ￿rms start and stop exporting. In particular,
exporters that would have stopped exporting in normal times delay doing so in an expansion.
Similarly, an economic expansion will attract new exporters that in normal times would not have
entered that market. However, because most ￿rms are far from being at the margin of being
indi⁄erent to participating in foreign markets, the stock of exporters does not change much over the
business cycle. Similarly, we ￿nd that an economic expansion at home leads to a slow and sustained
expansion in the number of home ￿rms that export. We show that these predictions of are consistent
with evidence for U.S. ￿rms.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section brie￿ y reviews previous research related
to the export decisions of ￿rms and international business cycles. Section 3 develops a two-country
dynamic general equilibrium model with export penetration and continuation costs. Section 4
discusses the quantitative implications of the model. Section 5 explores the sensitivity of the model
to the costs of continuing to export, the characteristics of exporting ￿rms, the substitutability
between goods from the same and di⁄erent countries, and the taste for variety. Section 6 presents
new data on the timing of U.S. export decision over the business cycle and compares these moments
to those generated by the model. Section 7 concludes.
42. Related Research
Researchers have developed dynamic partial equilibrium models of the discrete choice to export.
The earliest models considered the export and pricing decisions of ￿rms facing ￿xed costs of entering
and continuing in foreign markets. (Examples of models of the export decisions with sunk costs in-
clude Baldwin (1988), Baldwin and Krugman (1989) and Dixit (1989a,b).) These models abstracted
from most heterogeneity across ￿rms. Instead, they focused on the export participation as well as
industry trade and pricing dynamics in response to a largely exogenous process for exchange rates.
As partial equilibrium models these papers are silent on aggregate trade and price dynamics
Recent, more empirically oriented work, has extended the original models of the export decision
to allow for heterogeneity in the abilities and opportunities of production units. (Examples of models
include Roberts and Tybout (1997), Aw, Chung and Roberts (1998), Clerides, Lach and Tybout
(1998), Bernard and Jensen (1999a) and Das, Roberts and Tybout (2001)). These papers use the
models to estimate the size of the sunk export costs and smaller continuation costs.2 Using annual
￿rm-level data on Colombian chemical producers from 1982 to 1991, Das, Roberts and Tybout
(2001) estimate that export penetration costs account for between 18.4 percent and 41.2 percent
of the annual value of a ￿rm￿ s exports. In 1999 U.S. dollars, these costs are estimated to be
between $730,000 and $1.6 million, depending on plant size. They estimate continuation costs to
be considerably smaller, on the order of 1 percent of the annual value of exports.
The dynamics of the trade balance and the terms of trade have been studied by Backus, Ke-
hoe, and Kydland (1994), henceforth BKK, in an equilibrium international business cycle model.
They ￿nd that a model with countries specialized in imperfectly substitutable goods and subject to
exogenous aggregate productivity can generate the key features of the trade balance, namely, coun-
tercyclical net exports and a negative contemporaneous correlation with the terms of trade. A key
prediction of this model is that the cross-correlation of the real exchange rate with the subsequent
2These papers also focus on the extent to which ￿rms become more productive by exporting. The evidence of this
learning is less conclusive,and hence, we abstract from this channel.
5net exports becomes positive within one quarter. This is counter to the common idea that there is
a J-curve (Magee 1973), which suggests long and variable lags. BKK ￿nd that lags in shipment and
capital accumulation can improve the ￿t of the model slightly. They also hypothesize that the type
of ￿xed costs of exporting considered here could be important for generating greater delays. The
frictions that give rise to export decisions have not been studied in an international business cycles
framework.
The focus here on international trade costs is related to a number of papers that have focused
on di⁄erent economic questions. First, with respect to features of business cycles, Stockman and
Tesar (1995) and Betts and Kehoe (2002) consider the e⁄ect of heterogeneity in trade costs across
di⁄erent goods.3 Obstfeld and Rogo⁄(2000) consider trade costs that lead some goods to be traded
only in some periods.4 Second, the export decisions of ￿rms introduces an extensive margin5 to
trade as the number of products available changes over time. Papers by Evenett and Venables
(2002), Hummels and Klenow (2002), Kehoe and Ruhl (2002) and Ruhl (2003) study the growth
in trade through the intensive and extensive margins. In our model, we ￿nd that the properties of
the model are most sensitive to how consumers value additional varieties of foreign goods. It is this
margin that generates the largest departures from the standard model of BKK. Finally, recent work
by Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, and Kortum (2003) and Melitz (2003) also consider the role of ￿rm
heterogeneity in an international context. These papers focus on the pattern of trade and welfare
gains from trade liberalization and do not consider aggregate ￿ uctuations.
3. Model
We develop a two-country model with in￿nitely lived consumers and heterogeneous ￿rms to
study the international transmission of business cycles. The production side of the model is de-
3Another approach has focused on frictions in international asset markets (see Baxter and Crucini (1995), Heath-
coate and Perri (2002) and Kehoe and Perri (2002)).
4Ghironi and Meltiz (2004) develop a model of ￿xed trade costs to primarily study real exchange rate dynamics.
5Head (2002) and Cook (2002) study international business cycle models in which the number of ￿rms varies over
time due to ￿xed costs of entry. These models do not consider the export decisions of ￿rms so that the available set
of goods is the same across countries.
6veloped to be consistent with certain characteristics and dynamics of exporters described in the
previous section. This requires taking a stand on what determines a ￿rm. We associate a ￿rm with
a unique variety of a di⁄erentiated good with a production process that is subject to idiosyncratic
technology shocks.
There are two countries, home and foreign. Each country is populated by a large number of
identical, in￿nitely lived consumers. In each period of time, the economy experiences an event st.
Let st = (s0;￿￿￿ ;st) denote the history of events from period 0 up to and including period t. The
probability of a history st, conditional on the information available at period 0, is de￿ned as ￿(stjs0).
The initial realization of an event at period 0, s0, is given.
In each country there is a large number of monopolistically competitive ￿rms each producing
a di⁄erentiated intermediate good. The many intermediate good producers are normalized to a
continuum with unit mass and are indexed i 2 [0;1]. An intermediate good producer uses capital
and labor inputs to produce its variety of intermediate input. Firms di⁄er in terms of total factor
productivity, capital and the markets they serve. All ￿rms sell their product in their own country
but only some ￿rms export their good abroad. When an intermediate good producer exports goods
abroad, the producer incurs some international trading cost. The size of the cost depends on the
producer￿ s export status in the previous period. There is a (relatively) high up-front sunk cost
￿0 that must be borne to gain entry into the export market. In subsequent periods, to continue
exporting, ￿rms incur a lower but nonzero period-by-period ￿xed continuation cost ￿1. If a ￿rm
does not pay this continuation cost, then it ceases to export. In future periods, the ￿rm can only
begin exporting by incurring the entry cost ￿0 again. These costs are valued in units of labor in the
destination market.
In each country, competitive ￿nal goods producers purchase intermediate inputs from those
￿rms actively selling in that country.6 The cost of exporting implies that the set of goods available
6Final good production technology does not require capital or labor inputs. The ￿nal good production technology
regulates a country￿ s preferences over local and imported varieties.
7to competitive ￿nal goods producers di⁄ers across countries. The entry and exit of exporting ￿rms
implies that the set of intermediate goods available in a country is changing over time. The ￿nal
goods are used for both domestic consumption and investment.
We assume that there are no economies of scale to exporting. In particular, it is not possible
for a single ￿rm to incur the ￿xed cost of exporting and then export multiple di⁄erent varieties of
intermediate goods. We take the view that ￿0 is a per variety cost of starting to export. In practice,
these ￿xed costs represent those costs associated with tailoring a product to the standards and
taste of foreign consumers, establishing marketing and distribution networks, and learning about
bureaucratic and administrative details in these new markets. For diverse goods, it is unlikely that
exporting one good reduces the ￿xed costs of exporting a second good.
In this economy, there exists a complete set of one-period state-contingent nominal bonds
denominated in the home currency. Let B
￿
st+1;st￿
denote the home consumer￿ s holding of a bond
purchased in state st with payo⁄ in state st+1: Let B￿ ￿
st+1;st￿
denote the foreign consumer￿ s
holding of this bond. The state-contingent bond B(st) pays 1 unit of home currency if st occurs,
and 0 otherwise. Let Q(st+1jst) denote the nominal price of the state-contingent bond B(st+1) given
st. All the intermediate and ￿nal good producers are owned by domestic consumers. It is assumed
that these ownership claims cannot be traded.
A. Consumer￿ s Problem























Q(st+1jst)B(st+1) ￿ P(st)W(st)L(st) + B(st) + ￿(st) + P(st)T(st);
8where C(st) and L
￿
st￿
are the ￿nal good consumption and labor, respectively; P(st) and W
￿
st￿
denote the price level and wage rate; ￿(st) is the sum of pro￿ts of the home country￿ s intermediate
good producers; and T(st) is a lump sum transfer from the government. The discount factor is ￿.
The problem of foreign consumers is analogous to this problem. Prices and allocations in the
foreign country are represented with an asterisk. To be clear, money has no role in this economy.











where ￿ denotes the foreign variables and e(st) is the nominal exchange rate.











where Ui(st) denotes the derivatives of the utility function with respect to its arguments. The
price of the state-contingent bond is standard. With arbitrage, the complete asset markets assump-










where ￿ = q(s0)UC(s0)=U￿
C(s0).7
7In the simulation exercises, ￿ is normalized to be 1.
9B. Final Good Producers
In the home country, ￿nal goods are produced using only home and foreign intermediate goods.
A ￿nal good producer can purchase from any of the home intermediate good producers but can
purchase only from those foreign intermediate good producers that are actively selling in the home
market. The set of foreign ￿rms actively selling in the home country is denoted by E￿(st); where
i 2 E￿(st) if the ith ￿rm is a foreign exporter in st.
























where D(st) is the output of ￿nal goods and yd
h(i;st) and yd
f(i;st) are inputs of intermediate goods
purchased from home ￿rm i and foreign ￿rm i, respectively. The parameter a1 determines the weight
of home goods in ￿nal good consumption. The elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods
that are produced in the same country is 1=(1￿￿), and the elasticity of substitution between home
and foreign aggregate inputs is 1=(1 ￿ ￿).
With the export margin of the model, the measure of foreign varieties used in production of
the composite foreign good changes over time. With a typical Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator there is a
bene￿t to using smaller amounts of a greater number of varieties. To counteract the increasing
returns to scale from this love-of-variety e⁄ect, we modify the aggregator of the foreign composite
by introducing the additional term N￿￿￿: This term allows us to separate the love-of-variety e⁄ect
from the degree of market power, which is related to elasticity of substitution between individual
varieties (Benassy 1996). We explore the role of these e⁄ects in our sensitivity analysis.
The ￿nal goods market is competitive. In each period t, given the ￿nal good price at home
P(st), the ith home intermediate good price at home Ph(i;st) for i 2 [0;1], and the ith foreign
intermediate good price at home Pf(i;st) for i 2 E￿(st), a home ￿nal good producer chooses inputs
10yd
h(i;st) for i 2 [0;1], and yd
































= 0 for i = 2 E￿(st). Solving































































C. International Trading Costs
An intermediate good producer can sell its product without frictions in its domestic market.
However, it is costly to sell its product abroad. Producers that export to the foreign country face
two sets of international trading costs. To enter the foreign market, an intermediate good producer
has to pay a (relatively) high initial entry cost ￿0. This permits the ￿rm to export in the current
period. From the following period on, to continue exporting, the producer has to pay a lower but
nonzero continuation costs ￿1 (< ￿0). The export penetration cost (￿0) and continuation cost (￿1)
are collected from foreign exporting ￿rms by the domestic government, and distributed lump-sum







[1 ￿ m￿(i;st￿1)]￿0 + m￿(i;st￿1)￿1
￿
di;
11where m￿(i;st) is an indicator function denoting the export status of the ith intermediate good
producer in st. Let m￿(i;st) = 1 if the ith foreign intermediate good producer is an exporter in st, 0
otherwise.8 From (8), we see that the trade cost depends on the exporter status from the previous





of foreign intermediate goods are available to home ￿nal good producers in state st.
D. Intermediate Goods Producers
In each country there is a large number of intermediate good producers normalized to a con-
tinuum with unit mass indexed i 2 [0;1] who behave as monopolistic competitors. An intermediate
good ￿rm produces its di⁄erentiated good with a Cobb-Douglas production technology,
(9) F(i;st) = A(i;st)k(i;st￿1)￿l(i;st)1￿￿ = yd
h(i;st) + y￿d
h (i;st);
where yh(i;st) and y￿
h(i;st) are the amounts of good i sold in the home and foreign intermediate
goods markets, respectively, and k(i;st￿1) and l(i;st) are the capital and labor inputs of the ￿rm i.
Capital used in production is augmented by investment of ￿nal goods, x(i;st). The law of motion
for capital is given by
(10) k(i;st) = (1 ￿ ￿)k(i;st￿1) + x(i;st);
where ￿ is the depreciation rate.
The term A(i;st) denotes the productivity of the ith ￿rm and is composed of a country-wide
8In reality, most of the costs are paid to agents that help exporting ￿rms, not to the foreign government. However,
no matter to whom the costs are paid initially, the payment goes to consumers ultimately. Additionally, in practice
some of these costs are also paid to domestic agents. The results of the simulation exercises are not sensitive to the
division of these costs across countries. To make matters simple, it is assumed that the costs are paid to the foreign
government.
12component z(st), and a ￿rm-speci￿c component ￿(i;st) such that
lnA(i;st) = z(st) + ￿(i;st):
The country-wide component z(st) may be correlated across countries and evolves according to a
vector autoregressive process (VAR) with the foreign country-wide productivity, z￿(st),
Z(st) = MZ(st￿1) + ￿(st);￿(st)
iid ￿ N(0;￿);
where M is a coe¢ cient matrix; Z(st) = [z(st);z￿(st)]0 and ￿(st) = [￿(st);￿￿(st)]0. The ￿rm-speci￿c




Consider the problem of an intermediate good producer from the home country in state st. The
individual state of a ￿rm is summarized by the triple (￿;k;m); where we temporarily drop the ￿rm
index and aggregate state. The intermediate good producer chooses current prices Ph;P￿
h; inputs of
























h(i;st) ￿ P￿(st)[m￿1 + (1 ￿ m)￿0]
￿
;
subject to the production technology (9), the law of motion for capital (10), and the constraints that
supplies to home and foreign intermediate goods market yh(i;st) and y￿
h(i;st) are equal to demands
by home and foreign ￿nal good producers yd
h(i;st) and yd￿
h (i;st) from (5) and its foreign analogue.
Here, Pr(￿0) denotes the probability of an idiosyncratic shock ￿0.
13Let the value of the ith producer if it exports in st be
V 1 ￿
￿;k;m;st￿




















h(i;st) ￿ e(st)P￿(st)[m￿1 + (1 ￿ m)￿0];


















￿h(i;st) = Ph(i;st)yh(i;st) ￿ P(st)w(st)l(i;st) ￿ P(st)x(i;st)











Clearly the value of a producer depends on its export status and is monotonically increasing and
continuous in ￿: Moreover V 1 intersects V 0 from below only once.9 Hence, it is possible to solve
for the ￿rm-speci￿c productivity at which a ￿rm is indi⁄erent between exporting or not exporting.
This level of technology di⁄ers by the ￿rms current export status. The critical level of technology
for exporters and nonexporters, ￿1 and ￿0, satisfy
V 1 ￿
￿1;k;1;st￿





= V 0 ￿
￿0;k;0;st￿
; (12)
In general these critical technology levels will di⁄er across ￿rms based on their capital level.
9If the di⁄erence between ￿0 and ￿1 is very large, V
1 > V
0 for all ￿ 2 (￿1;1) for some s
t. Since the data show
that some of the previous exporters exit from foreign markets each period, it is assumed throughout that the shocks
are small enough that this does not occur.
14However, the assumption that ￿rm-speci￿c technology shocks are iid implies that each ￿rm expects
to draw the same level of technology tomorrow. Consequently, a ￿rm￿ s current capital stock is
entirely determined by its export status in the previous period. As export status is a zero-one
choice, the distribution of capital over ￿rms is characterized by two mass points. This then implies
that the critical technology level of an exporting ￿rm also determines the technology of the marginal
exporting ￿rm, which we denote by ￿1
￿
st￿
: Among last period exporters, only those with a ￿rm-
speci￿c productivity greater than ￿1(st) will continue to export in state st. Likewise, the critical




From (11), (12), and the independence of the ￿rm-speci￿c productivity, the percentage of
exporters in st among exporters and nonexporters in st￿1, n1(st) and n0(st), respectively, can be
de￿ned as
n1(st) = Pr[￿ > ￿1(st)];
n0(st) = Pr[￿ > ￿0(st)]:
Then, the law of motion for the export ratio among intermediate good producers, N(st), is
(13) N(st) = n1(st)N(st￿1) + n0(st)[1 ￿ N(st￿1)]:
Figure 1 illustrates the values of ￿rms across ￿rm-speci￿c productivity depending on export
status. In the absence of trade costs, the value of a ￿rm that exports always exceeds the value of
not exporting for all ￿rm-speci￿c productivity. This is true because, by exporting, the ￿rm has
a larger market for its goods. Without the ￿xed costs, all ￿rms would export their good abroad.
However, in the presence of international trade costs, it is not optimal for some ￿rms to export
goods abroad. The value of an exporting ￿rm is reduced by the amount of the trade costs, ￿0 or ￿1
depending on the export status last period. Since the cost of being a new exporter exceeds the cost
of continuing to export, ￿0 > ￿1, the value of being a new exporter is always lower than the value
15of being a continuing exporter. This implies that ￿1(st) < ￿0(st) for all st. Hence, the probability
of being an exporter in st is always higher for last period exporters than last period nonexporters
(n1(st) > n0(st)) and there is exporter hysteresis.
E. Equilibrium De￿nition
In an equilibrium, variables satisfy several resource constraints. The ￿nal goods market clearing
conditions are given by c(st) +
R
x(i;st)di = D(st), and c￿(st) +
R
x￿(i;st)di = D￿(st). The inter-
mediate goods market clearing conditions are yd
h(i;st) = yh(i;st) for i 2 [0;1], yd
f(i;st) = yf(i;st)
for i 2 E￿(st), yd￿
f (i;st) = y￿
f(i;st) for i 2 [0;1], and yd￿
h (i;st) = y￿
h(i;st) for i 2 E(st). The
labor market clearing conditions are L(st) =
R 1
0 l(i;st)di, and L￿(st) =
R 1
0 l￿(i;st)di. The prof-














di. The government budget constraint is given by (8) and the foreign ana-
logue. The international bond market clearing condition is given by B(st) + B￿(st) = 0. Finally,
our decision to write the budget constraints in each country in units of the local currency permits
us to normalize the price of consumption in each country as P(st) = P￿(st) = 1.
An equilibrium of the economy is a collection of allocations for home consumers C(st), L(st),
B(st+1); allocations for foreign consumers C￿(st), L￿(st), B￿(st+1); allocations for home ￿nal goods
producers D(st), yd(h;i;st) for i 2 [0;1], and yd(f;i;st) for i 2 E￿(st); allocations for foreign ￿nal
good producers D￿(st), yd￿
f (i;st) for i 2 [0;1], and yd￿
h (i;st) for i 2 E(st); allocations and prices
for home intermediate good producers l(i;st), x(i;st), yh(i;st); and Ph(i;st) for i 2 [0;1], y￿
h(i;st)
and P￿
h(i;st) for i 2 E(st); allocations and prices for foreign intermediate good producers l￿(i;st),
x￿(i;st), yf(i;st) and Pf(i;st) for i 2 E￿(st), y￿
f(i;st) and P￿
f (i;st) for i 2 [0;1]; the export sta-













; and bond prices Q(st+1jst) that satisfy the following conditions: (i)
the consumer allocations solve the consumer￿ s problem; (ii) the ￿nal good producers￿allocations
16solve their pro￿t maximization problems; (iii) the intermediate good producers￿allocations, prices,
and export statuses solve their pro￿t maximization problems; (iv) the market clearing conditions
hold; and (v) the transfers satisfy the government budget constraint.
We focus on a stationary equilibrium. A stationary equilibrium consists of stationary decision
rules and pricing rules that are functions of the state of the economy. The state of the economy
is completely described by the distribution of the state variables (￿;k;m) for all individual ￿rms
in both countries and the aggregate technology shocks. The state of the economy records the joint
distribution of the capital stock, technology, and export status of ￿rms in both countries. In general,
keeping track of this distribution over time is computationally di¢ cult. However, the assumption
that ￿rm-speci￿c technology shocks are iid greatly simpli￿es the analysis, since it implies that last
period￿ s export status is su¢ cient to determine a ￿rm￿ s current capital stock. As ￿rms are either
exporters or nonexporters, at any point in time ￿rms will have either a relatively low capital stock
if they did not export yesterday or a relatively high capital stock if they did export yesterday.
Consequently, the distribution of the capital stock in the economy is completely summarized by
the aggregate shocks, Z and Z￿; the capital stock of exporters, K1 and K￿
1; the capital stock of
nonexporters, K0 and K￿
0; and the share of exporters in each country, N and N￿.
F. Calibration
We now describe the functional forms and parameter values considered for our benchmark
economy. The parameter values used in the simulation exercises are reported in Table 1. The





where 1=￿ is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, and ￿ is the share parameter for consump-
tion in the composite commodity.
In the steady state, the real interest rate is equal to (1￿￿)=￿. The annual real return to capital
17is around 4 percent. This gives ￿ = 0:99. The steady state constraint gives Y = C + ￿K. Dividing






. With the annual capital output ratio of 2.5 and consumption to
output ratio of 0.75 as the average of the postwar U.S. data, ￿ = 0:025. The curvature parameter, ￿,
determines the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and the relative risk aversion of consumers.
We consider a value of ￿ = 2 as this is widely used in the international business cycle literature,
e.g., Backus et al. (1994), Stockman and Tesar (1995), and Kehoe and Perri (2002).
The parameter ￿ determines an intermediate good producer￿ s markup. Schmitt-Grohe (1997)
summarizes the results of empirical studies estimating this markup. These estimates vary widely
from 3 percent to 70 percent. Based on Basu and Fernald (1994), ￿ is set to be equal to 0.9 and
yields an intermediate good producer￿ s markup of about 11 percent. The parameter ￿ determines
the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign aggregates, 1=(1￿￿). There is considerable
disagreement over an appropriate value. Using the U.S. quarterly data of 163 industries at the
3-digit SIC level from 1980:1 to 1988:4, Gallaway et al. (2000) estimate that the elasticities range
from 0.14 to 3.49. In the simulation exercises, ￿ is set to 1/3 so that the elasticity equals to 1.5 as
in Backus et al. (1994) and Chari et al. (2001).
The parameter ￿ determines the love-of-variety. To our knowledge, there are no empirical
estimates of this parameter. Consequently, we follow the literature, which implicitly assumes that
the love-of-variety is tied to the elasticity of substitution across varieties, and set ￿ = 0: In this
case, consumers have a preference for spreading consumption across more varieties. We examine
three other cases for ￿ 2 f￿ ￿ 1;1 ￿ ￿;1g: When ￿ = ￿ ￿ 1; we double the love-of-variety e⁄ect.
When ￿ = 1 ￿ ￿; we eliminate the love-of-variety e⁄ect so that consumers are indi⁄erent between
consuming n units of a single good or 1 unit of n identical goods. When ￿ = 1; consumers dislike
variety and would rather concentrate all of their consumption in a single variety.10
In the model, we assume that pro￿t income is attributed proportionally to labor and capital.
10In this case, we assume that the dislike of variety is external to the consumer so that consumers will consume
some of each variety but would prefer a world in which there were fewer choices.
18We choose capital￿ s share of income from postwar U.S. data to be ￿ = 0:36. The share parameter
for consumption in the composite commodity, ￿, is set to be equal to 0:294. This value is obtained
from the observation that the average time devoted to work is 1=4 of the total available time, and
the consumption-output ratio is about 0.75 in the postwar period.
We follow Kehoe and Perri (2002) in choosing the country speci￿c productivity process. The
model is simulated for 1000 times with 120 periods using the linearization methods suggested by
King, et al. (1988a,b), and Klein (2000). The equations of the model are summarized in the
appendix.
Exporter Characteristics and Hysteresis
The parameters ￿0;￿1;a1 and ￿￿ jointly determine the amount of trade, characteristics of
exporters and nonexporters, and the dynamics of export status.11 To pin these parameters down,
we consider the following evidence. First, using annual data on U.S. ￿rms in the LRD from 1984
to 1992, Bernard and Jensen (1999a) ￿nd that about 87.4 percent of exporters continue exporting
in the next period, and among those that did not export last period, about 86.1 percent of ￿rms
remain in the nonexporter status. Consequently, we set n1 = n0 = 3:5 percent to match an average
of the quarterly starter and stopper ratios. Second, Bernard and Jensen (1999a) ￿nd that exporters
are 12 percent to 18 percent more productive than nonexporters. Finally, we note that for the
U.S., the import to output ratio is approximately 15 percent. Choosing these parameters jointly to
match these statistics yields values of ￿0 = 0:24897;￿1 = 0:05043;a2 = 0:321 and ￿￿ = 0:5:12 The
choice of ￿￿ = 0:5 is made as it leads exporters to be 15.5 percent more productive and to ship
11An alternate approach to calibrate the ￿rm shocks is to use previous estimate for the ￿rm-speci￿c productivity
process. However, these studies tend to rely heavily on the sample of ￿rms. With very small ￿rms in the sample,
the variance becomes very large. With only large ￿rms, such as ￿rms that can be found in S&P 500, the size of
the variance becomes very small. Bernard, et al. (2003) estimate the distribution across plants of value added per
workers using ASM 1992. They ￿nd that the sample standard deviation of the productivity across ￿rms is about 0.76.
However, their estimate di⁄ers due to the di⁄erences in production functions and the processes of technology shocks.
For the robustness of the simulation results, various values of the standard deviation for the ￿rm-speci￿c productivity
are considered.
12Under the zero export penetration costs, ￿0 = ￿1 = 0, a2 set to be equal to 0.315 to match the exports to output
ratio of 0.15.
1990.2 percent more output (and hire 90.2 percent more workers). The characteristics of exporters in
terms of employment, and output matches up well with the data as exporters produce 104 to 115
percent more output than nonexporters and hire 77 percent to 95 percent more workers. With these
parameter values, on average, a nonexporter expects to pay about 16.5 percent of sales as entry
costs, while an exporter expects to pay about 1.7 percent of sales to remain in the foreign market in
the steady state. In total, these international trading costs represent 1.3 percent of GDP, or about
8 percent of exports.
Figure 2 shows how exporter characteristics (in a log scale) vary with the probability of exiting.
The likelihood of exiting negatively a⁄ects the relative capital stock of the typical exporter but
positively a⁄ects its productivity, employment, and output advantages. At one extreme, when
export participation is essentially iid, there is no exporter hysteresis and it is the most productive
￿rms that export each period regardless of their previous export decision. With export participation
and technology independent across periods, all ￿rms choose the same capital stock. At the other
extreme, when export decisions are almost permanent, exporters and nonexporters are essentially
the same in terms of productivity, but because exporters have a larger market for their goods, and
expect to maintain this presence in future periods, they hire more workers and maintain a larger
capital stock. Thus exporter hysteresis appears important in matching the observed exporter premia
in the data.
G. Measurement
Prior to evaluating the model, we consider some important measurement issues in comparing
the model to the data. First, consider the notion of import prices. The number of varieties imported
in￿ uences the ideal price index but are not included in the price indices of statistical agencies (see
Feenstra 1994). For consistency then, we measure the price of imports as the weighted average price











































The number of foreign varieties is included in the CPI as changes in the extensive margin a⁄ect the
relative weight on the composite imported and domestic goods. In the subsequent analysis, we note
how these changes from the ideal prices a⁄ect the results.
4. Results
In this section, we consider the dynamic behavior of the export participation model versus
the standard model of BKK. These models￿distinct export participation decisions suggest that
substantial di⁄erences should exist in the aggregate trade dynamics. In particular, the export
decision model includes the key feature emphasized by previous authors as important for explaining
net export dynamics: sunk costs of exporting. When shocks to productivity change the relative
cost of producing foreign goods, foreign exporters may be slow to exit the home market and home
exporters may be slow to enter the foreign market. These changes in export participation in￿ uence
trade ￿ ows and thus net export and real exchange rate dynamics. In contrast, the standard model
does not have this channel.
For comparison sake, we modify the standard model of BKK to include heterogenous, monop-
olistically competitive ￿rms. We denote this as the No Costs model. We also compare our model of
endogenous entry and exit to a third, Fixed exit, model in which the cost of continuing exporting is
stochastic. Typically an exporter can continue exporting for free but periodically receives a shock
21that requires repaying the start-up cost in order to export. In this model, the ￿rms that stops
exporting are nearly identical to those that continue exporting, so that even the least productive
exporters continue exporting. We calibrate the model to match the trade share, entry and exit rates.
Figure 3 depicts the ￿rst 25 periods of each economy￿ s response to a persistent aggregate
productivity shock driven by a 1 standard deviation productivity shock. The ￿gure reveals similar
net export and real exchange rate dynamics across all three models.
The three models generate very similar real exchange rate behavior, although the model with
exogenous exit has the smallest change in the real exchange rate and our model of endogenous exit
has the largest change. In all three models, net exports decline on impact and then increase, moving
into surplus with a lag. In the no cost model, net exports move into surplus in the eighth quarter
following the shock, while with sunk costs of exporting, net exports go into surplus in the seventh
quarter.
Next we consider the cross-correlation function of net exports and the real exchange rate for
these three models. Figure 4 plots the correlation between qt and nxt+k with twelve quarters of
leads and lags. The dynamics of the no cost model have been discussed extensively in BKK. Our
model of sunk costs generates nearly identical dynamics. This is not surprising given the similarities
of the impulse responses.
BKK show that lags in the time to trade or build capital can shift the cross-correlation function
between net exports and the real exchange rate to the right. We ￿nd that ￿xed costs of trade do not
have any noticeable impact on these comovements. In our model, exporters can begin exporting in
the same period in which they incur the cost of entering the market. This suggests that focusing on
the delays ￿rms face in expanding their foreign sales may be what matters most for understanding
the dynamics between the real exchange rate and net exports.
We now consider the properties of the model by examining the simulated model￿ s moments.
We report the Hodrick-Prescott ￿ltered statistics for the data, the benchmark economy, and some
variations on that economy in Table 2. We discuss the variations in the next section. The data are
22for the U.S. economy from 1975:1 through 2004:3. Since our focus is on trade dynamics between
industrialized economies, we remove the e⁄ect of petroleum from our measures of net exports and
relative prices. Net exports are measured as the nominal trade balance net of petroleum imports.
The terms of trade is measured as the ratio of the price of non-oil imports to the price of exports.
Casual inspection of these tables indicates that there are a number of dimensions on which the
standard model does not match certain features of international business cycles.13 For the most
part, the inclusion of sunk costs of exporting does not appear to noticeably alter model performance
along these dimensions.
Table 2 reveals that the standard deviations of output, investment, employment, consumption,
net exports, and the real exchange rate are essentially identical for the standard no cost model and
the model with ￿xed costs of exporting.
The model with sunk costs di⁄ers slightly from the no cost model in two dimensions. First, the
sunk cost model generates slightly less comovement in economic activity, since investment, output,
and employment are less correlated across countries than in the no cost model. The di⁄erence is
small though, less than 0.01 percentage points. Second, net exports are slightly more persistent
with sunk costs of exporting. Again, this di⁄erence is minor, only 0.02 percentage points.
The discussion above raises two issues. First, given that exit is largely exogenous in the ￿xed
exit model and endogenous in the sunk cost model, so that the exiting exporters exiting in the ￿xed
exit model are on average much more productive than those exiting with endogenous exit, why are
the aggregate dynamics so similar? Second, how can the presence of costs which lead ￿rms to change
their participation in export markets have so little impact on aggregate dynamics? To resolve these
questions, we consider the di⁄erences across di⁄erent parameterizations of our economies.
13The model exhibits low volatility of relative prices, too much consumption risk sharing and not enough comovement
in economic activity. These puzzles are discussed in Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland (1995).
235. Sensitivity
We consider some alternate speci￿cations. All parameters for these speci￿cations are described
in Table 1.
Exporter Persistence
We begin by examining the sensitivity of our results to the amount of hysteresis in the economy,
measured by the probability that a current exporter stops exporting in the following period. We
consider two extremes. First, we consider the case in which there is a 0.5 percent probability of
exiting so that exporters are almost permanently exporting. Next, we consider the case where there
is a 50-50 chance of continuing to export in the following period. The results are reported in the
columns High Persistence and IID Exporters, respectively. Surprisingly, the properties of these
calibrations are nearly identical to our baseline case.
As we have already seen, the persistence of exporter status a⁄ects the exporter premium. That
exporter characteristics do not a⁄ect the model￿ s properties suggests that it doesn￿ t matter whether
there are a few productive exporters selling a lot or many productive exporters selling a little each.
That these models perform so similarly suggests that the distribution of ￿rms￿characteristics does
not matter14 and explains why the ￿xed exit and endogenous exit models are nearly identical.
Taste for Variety
To further identify the source of the model￿ s invariance to export decisions, we now explicitly
consider how consumers value changes in the number of varieties available when exporters enter
and exit. The parameter ￿ controls the taste for variety. We consider two cases. At one extreme,
we double the love-of-variety in the standard model, ￿ = ￿ ￿ 1. At the other extreme, we consider
the case where consumers strongly dislike variety and would like to concentrate consumption in a
single good15, ￿ = 1. The results are reported, respectively, in the columns Love Variety and Hate
14This is a statement about exporter decisions and business cycles. This is not saying that these considerations are
unimportant for welfare.
15We assume the taste for variety is external to the consumer so that consumers will choose some of each variety
available.
24Variety.
Changing the taste for variety primarily alters the international comovement of activity. In par-
ticular, we see that international risk sharing, measured by consumption correlations, is increasing
in the love-of-variety, while business cycle synchronization, measured by comovements in economic
activity, is decreasing in the love-of-variety.16
When consumers dislike variety, an expansion in the number of imported goods lowers the
marginal utility of an additional imported good. This acts as both a negative shock to the marginal
utility of consumption and a shift in taste toward locally produced goods. This implies that an
expansion at home that leads more home ￿rms to export will lead to an expansion in production in
foreign and a much smaller expansion in consumption. When consumers love variety, these e⁄ects
operate in reverse.
High Markups
We now consider the e⁄ect of making goods from the same country less substitutable. For the
sake of comparison, we include the results for the no cost model. Making goods less substitutable
has two e⁄ects. First, it raises the market power of individual producers. Second, it increases the
love-of-variety. To identify the role of each channel we also consider the case in which there is no
love-of-variety e⁄ect, reported in the column CRS.
The model with no love-of-variety channel is nearly identical to the no cost model, while the
sunk cost model di⁄ers noticeably. Based on this, we conclude that understanding how variety is
valued is critical to evaluating the role of export participation for both business cycle dynamics and
welfare considerations.
16When there is strong love or hate of variety e⁄ect, whether the ￿xed costs are paid in home or foreign goods or
labor matters for international business cycles. Alessandria and Choi (2002) show that with ￿xed costs paid in units
of the home ￿nal good, when consumers hate variety there is no consumption-output anomaly as comovements in
output and consumption are approximately equal.
25Elasticity of Substitution
Continuing with high markups, we now consider the e⁄ect of making home and foreign vari-
eties equally substitutable (￿ = 1=(1 ￿ 1=￿)). As we￿ ve noted, there is a large range of Armington
elasticities and ￿ = 3 ￿ts in this range. The results for the no cost model and the sunk cost model
with no love-of-variety e⁄ect are reported in the last two columns. We ￿nd that the models di⁄er
in that the model with sunk costs generates net exports that are substantially more volatile (0.29
vs. 0.20) and generates less comovement between the real exchange rate and net exports (0.38 and
0.23). More important, this calibration generates very little business cycle synchronization so that
international comovements are far from what we see in the data. This is a larger problem in the
sunk cost model, since we ￿nd that economic activity is even less synchronized than in the standard
model.
Our sensitivity analysis indicates that the reason the benchmark model does not di⁄er much
from the no cost model is that home and foreign composites are not very substitutable and goods
from the same country are very close substitutes. With a low markup and very little love-of-variety,
it essentially doesn￿ t matter whether consumers have a lot of a few goods or a little of many goods.
6. Exporters and Business Cycles
We now study the export participation decisions of ￿rms over the business cycle in the model
and the data. First, we discuss the export participation decisions in the model and then we turn to
the data. Figure 5 depicts the ￿rst 25 periods of each economy￿ s response to a persistent aggregate
productivity shock driven by a 1 standard deviation productivity shock in the home country.
The export sector in both countries expands on impact. The number of home exporters expands
gradually and persistently, while the number of foreign exporters expands only for the ￿rst two
periods and then begins contracting. The di⁄erence in the number of home and foreign exporters
largely mirrors the dynamics of net exporters. The sudden and large expansion of the foreign export
sector is driven by the large increase in investment at home, temporarily raising the demand for
26foreign goods. The sustained increase in the home export sector is a result of the persistent cost
advantage of home ￿rms and the resulting net export surpluses.
We now compare the predictions of the model to the data. The ideal data for such an analysis
are a panel of ￿rm-level exports by destination markets for multiple source countries. To our
knowledge, such data does not exist. We do have data on the total number of U.S. exporters by
certain destination markets from 1995 to 2003, as reported in the Census Department￿ s annual
Pro￿le of Exporting Firms. We focus on export participation by U.S. exporters to a limited set of
OECD countries.
For each destination i we have data on the number of exporters, Ni
t; and the total value of
exports, EXi
t; de￿ ated by the U.S. GDP de￿ ator. For each country we collect data on real GDP,
Y i
t ; and the bilateral real exchange rate with the U.S., qi
t: We also include data on U.S. GDP.
The model is annualized to match the data. The parameters are reported in Table 1. All data
are Hodrick-Prescott (1997) ￿ltered with a smoothing parameter of 6.25 (as suggested by Ravn
and Uhlig (2002)). Figure 6 plots the comovement of exporters with each of these four variables
for the data and the model. For each variable, there is substantial heterogeneity in comovements
across countries; however, the pattern of dynamics are consistent across countries so that we report
the average comovement. In these plots, we also include the moments predicted by our model of
endogenous entry and exit. The model ￿ts the data surprisingly well. We describe each panel
separately.
First, the data show that the number of exporters is highly correlated with the value of exports.
There is almost no relationship between exports and exporters at leads and lags. In the model, we
￿nd a stronger contemporaneous correlation between exports and exporters than in the data. The
model also predicts that exporters tend to lag trade ￿ ows. This is a feature of the sunk cost aspect of
trade. In particular, if trade is high today, then exporters delay exiting so that the stock of exporters
will remain high in the following period. In theory, with the ￿xed costs, high future trade ￿ ows will
also lead to high current exporters. That we don￿ t ￿nd much evidence of this may derive from the
27persistent exogenous productivity shocks. The largest e⁄ect of these shocks is upon impulse, which
is unanticipated.
The second feature of the data is that U.S. exporters tend to expand to foreign markets once the
U.S. economy is already booming, so that exporters tend to lag domestic GDP. This relationship is
predicted by the model. That domestic business cycles are strongly correlated with export decisions
seems to result from the impulse being a productivity shock that persistently lowers the costs of
producing goods for the export market.
The third feature of interest of the data concerns the dynamics of the real exchange rate and
number of exporters. Here we ￿nd that the data and the model match up quite well. There is
virtually no contemporaneous relationship between the real exchange rate and exporters. This can
be understood in the following way. The real exchange rate is the relative price of the two baskets of
goods. There is substantial home bias in these baskets so that the real exchange rate is essentially
determined by the ratio of productivity across countries. On the other hand, from the impulse
responses, we see that a positive productivity shock in one country leads to an expansion in the
export sector in both countries. Given an increase in productivity that leads to an expansion of the
export sector can occur in either country, there is no relationship between the real exchange rate
and exporters.
There is some evidence, though, that following a depreciation of the real exchange rate, U.S.
exporters tend to enter foreign markets. Moreover, we see that after U.S. exporters expand into a
market the real exchange rate tends to appreciate. This dynamic pattern can be understood from
the impulse responses. Following a positive productivity shock, the real exchange rate depreciates
and the export sector expands. This expansion is slow and sustained. During this expansion, the
real exchange rate begins to depreciate as it returns to steady state.
Finally, we consider the relationship between destination GDP and the number of U.S. ex-
porters. The data show that U.S. exporters enter foreign markets in anticipation of a foreign
expansion. In contrast, the model predicts that entry will lag the foreign expansion. One possibility
28for this discrepancy with the data is that some foreign expansions were triggered in part by pre-
dictable trade liberalizations. If this is the case, then exporters have an incentive to stay in foreign
markets longer, even if current sales are fairly low. This feature of the model would also generate
lower comovements with trade and the number of exporters.
7. Conclusions
It has long been argued that there are trading frictions in place that are important for under-
standing net export dynamics. Among these frictions, sunk costs of exporting, which lead ￿rms
to slowly exit foreign markets, are believed to have large consequences. In this paper, we embed
a model of these costs in an equilibrium business cycle model. We ￿nd that the dynamics of net
exports and the real exchange rate do not di⁄er much from those in a model without these sunk
costs. This is robust across many speci￿cations for which the business cycle properties of the model
are close to the data. We interpret this to imply that lags in expanding trade ￿ ows are potentially
more important for net export dynamics than the costs of entering and continuing exporting.
We do ￿nd that export decisions can potentially alter trade dynamics, but for a new reason.
Export decisions change the number of di⁄erent varieties of goods available in a country. If con-
sumers value or dislike variety, then export decisions have the potential to alter the international
transmission of business cycles. There is little independent evidence of the taste for variety, but we
￿nd that it is the key source of any di⁄erences between the benchmark model and a model with
export decisions. That we ￿nd comovements are closer to the data when consumers dislike variety
suggests that the gains to variety may be small or even negative. If this is the case, then the welfare
gains from increased variety may be overstated.
Our model of export decisions and the business cycle sheds some light on the timing of these
export decisions. We ￿nd that U.S. exporters tend to expand into foreign markets when U.S. GDP is
high and in anticipation of future foreign GDP growth. We also ￿nd some evidence that the current
real exchange rate is unrelated with current export participation, but that a depreciation leads to
29more entry in subsequent periods. More empirical work is necessary to determine the robustness of
these results.
The current model has a number of shortcomings. On the micro side, we have concentrated on
a limited set of facts about exporters. In particular, we have focused on the di⁄erences between the
average exporters and average nonexporters with little concern about the di⁄erence among ￿rms
within these sectors. Clearly, there are large di⁄erences between major exporters, like GM, Ford, and
Boeing, and the rest of the export sector which may matter. Also, we have not focused on the pattern
of export growth of plants. On the macro side, there are aspects of international business cycles
that our benchmark model cannot explain. In particular, the model predicts too little comovement
in economic activity across countries and relative prices that are much too smooth compared to the
data. Perhaps, in an environment in which these puzzles are less pronounced, export decisions may
have a greater impact on net export dynamics.
30A. Data Appendix
Aggregate Data: Aggregate moments are computed for the U.S. over the period 1975:1
through 2004:3. The following data are from the BEA: Consumption, GDP, Fixed Investment,
Imports, and Exports; nominal GDP, exports and non-oil imports are used to construct the ratio of
net exports to GDP; and the terms of trade measured as the ratio of the price of non-oil imports to
the price of exports. The Real Exchange Rate series is the Federal Reserve￿ s trade weighted dollar
index. Labor is measured as total non-farm employees (CES0000000001).
Exporter Data: The number of exporters is collected from annual reports of the U.S. Census
Bureau: Pro￿le of U.S. Exporting Companies. Trade is from U.S. Census Bureau: U.S. Trade
(Imports, Exports and Balance) by country database. These are de￿ ated using the U.S. GDP
de￿ ator from the BEA. Real exchange rates are constructed using bilateral exchange rate from
Haver Analytics and annual in￿ ation rates from the IFS World tables. Real GDP is also from the
IFS World tables and for the U.S. from the BEA. The exporter data are from 1995 to 2003. The
other variables are from 1994 to 2004. The destination countries are Australia, Belgium, Canada,
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland, and the United
Kingdom.
B. Appendix
The following equations describe the complete economy.






































The real exchange rate is de￿ned as q(st) =
e(st)P￿(st)
P(st) . Iterating on (19) yields





31where ￿ = q(s0)UC(s0)=U￿
C(s0). For the simulations ￿ is normalized to be 1.
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The resource constraint for the ￿nal goods gives
(24) D(st) = C(st) + I(st):
Intermediate Good Producer￿ s Problem: The ￿rst order conditions for the ith home interme-

























+ P(st+1)(1 ￿ ￿)
￿
:
The marginal cost of production is equal to W(st)=FL(i;st) and prices are a constant mark-up over
marginal cost.
The resource constraint is de￿ned as for good i 2 [0;1]
(27) y(h;i;st) + m(i;st)y￿(h;i;st) = A(i;st)K(i;st￿1)￿L(i;st)1￿￿:
From the demand functions for intermediate goods (21) and (22), and the price decisions (25),
































where ￿ = 1￿￿
1￿￿(1￿￿), and ￿ = 1
1￿￿ ￿ 1
1￿￿. Since ￿(i;st) follows an iid. normal distribution, equation
(26) implies that K(i;st) is independent of ￿(i;st) but depends on the ￿rm￿ s export status, m(i;st),
32and the state of the world, st.
(29) K(i;st) =
￿
K0(st) if m(i;st) = 0;
K1(st) if m(i;st) = 1:
Hence, the su¢ cient statistics for the distribution of the capital among home intermediate good
producers are K0(st), K1(st), and N(st).
Marginal Exporters: Let Lm;m0(i;st) and Im;m0(i;st) be the potentially sub-optimal levels of
labor inputs and investment for the ith ￿rm when m(i;st￿1) = m and m(i;st) = m0, respectively.
Clearly Im;m0(i;st) = Im;m0(st) = Km0(st)￿(1￿￿)Km(st). The problem of ￿rm i with state (￿;k;m)










where V 0 is the maximal value of not exporting in the current period and V 1 is equal to the
maximal value of exporting this period. From the mark-up pricing (25), the value of the ith ￿rm





1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
￿(1 ￿ ￿)
￿









where m, m0 2 f0;1g. The ￿rm-speci￿c productivity of marginal exporters among last period
exporters and non-exporters, ￿1(st) and ￿0(st), satisfy
(31) V 1 ￿
￿j(st);Kj(st￿1);m;st￿
= V 0 ￿
￿j(st);Kj(st￿1);m;st￿
;







; then the marginal exporter conditions (31) can be rewritten as
0 =
￿





















































Among last period exporters, if the ￿rm-speci￿c productivity ￿(i;st) is greater (less) than ￿1(st),
the producer will (will not) export goods abroad in st. Among last period non-exporters, if the
￿rm-speci￿c productivity ￿(j;st) is greater (less) than ￿0(st), the producer will (not) export goods
abroad in st. Thus, the percentage of exporters in st among non-exporters and exporters in st￿1,
n0(st) and n1(st), respectively, can be de￿ned as
(34) nm(st) = 1 ￿ ￿[￿m(st)];
33where m = f0;1g. ￿(￿) is the cdf: of ￿(i;st). N(st) is the percentage of exporters in st among all
intermediate good producers. N(st) evolves as
(35) N(st) = n1(st)N(st￿1) + n0(st)[1 ￿ N(st￿1)]:
Aggregate Variables








= [1 ￿ N(st)]K0(st) + N(st)K1(st): (36)
The aggregate investment at home in st is de￿ned as
(37) I(st) = K(st) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)K(st￿1):
Labor Demand: The average labor demand in st from last period non-exporters and exporters,

































































where m ={0,1}. ￿(￿) is the pdf: of ￿. The home aggregate labor demand is de￿ned as
(39) L(st) = [1 ￿ N(st￿1)]L0(st) + N(st￿1)L1(st):













+ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
:
Price Indices: From the mark-up pricing (25), and the labor demand function for the ith ￿rm,





















































































































































From the aggregate price index (23),


















Values of Firms: Let Vm(st);m = f0;1g, be the average values of ￿rms among the ￿rms that

















These average values of ￿rms can be rewritten as
Vm(st) =
￿





[1 ￿ nm(st)]K0(st) (46)
+nm(st)K1(st)
￿






[1 ￿ nm(st)]V0(st+1) + nm(st)V1(st+1)
￿
;
35and the di⁄erence between V1(st) and V0(st) gives
V1(st) ￿ V0(st) =
￿
1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
￿(1 ￿ ￿)
￿
P(st)W(st)[L1(st) ￿ L0(st)] (47)
￿P(st)
￿
[n0(st) ￿ n1(st)][K0(st) ￿ K1(st)]
￿






The conditions for marginal exporters can be rewritten as















































Notice that by substituting [V1(st+1) ￿ V0(st+1)] with (47), (48) becomes a static equation.































The gross domestic product, Y (st) is de￿ned as












Equilibrium: Under the normalization of price indices, P(st) = P￿(st) = 1, we have 6 dynamic
equations:17
(40) and foreign analogue for K0(st) and K￿
0(st), and K1(st) and K￿
1(st);
(47) and foreign analogue for V1(st) ￿ V0(st) and V ￿
1 (st) ￿ V ￿
0 (st); and, 37 static equations:
(14) and foreign analogue for W(st) and W￿(st);
(20) for q(st);
(24) and foreign analogue for D(st) and D￿(st);
(34) and foreign analogue for n0(st) and n￿




t) is substituted by other variables using (15) and (18).
36(35) and foreign analogue for N(st) and N￿(st);
(36) and foreign analogue for K(st) and K￿(st);
(37) and foreign analogue for I(st) and I￿(st);
(38) and foreign analogue for L0(st) and L￿
0(st), and L1(st) and L￿
1(st);
(39) and foreign analogue for L(st) and L￿(st);
(43) and foreign analogue for P￿(h;st) and P(f;st);
(44) and foreign analogue for P(h;st) and P￿(f;st);
(45) and foreign analogue for P(st) and P￿(st);
(48) and foreign analogue for ￿0(st), ￿￿
0(st), ￿1(st), and ￿￿
1(st)18;
(49) and foreign analogue for IM(st) and IM￿(st);
(50) and foreign analogue for EX(st) and EX￿(st);
(51) and foreign analogue for Y (st) and Y ￿(st).
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40Table 1: Parameter Values
Benchmark Model
Preferences ￿ = 0:99, ￿ = 2, ￿ = 0:9, ￿ = 1=3, ￿ = 0:308
Production ￿ = 0:36, ￿ = 0:025, a1 = 1, a2 = 0:321
Productivity M11 = M22 = 0:95, M12 = M12 = 0,




Trade costs ￿0 = 0:0592, ￿1 = 0:01
V ariations
No Cost a2 = 0:315
Fixed Exit ￿0 = 0:2527; ￿1 = 0, Pr(exit shock) = 0:0367
Permanent Exporters a2 = 0:322;￿0 = 0:110; ￿1 = 0:012
IID Exporters a2 = 0:317;￿0 = ￿1 = 0:0047
Love Variety ￿ = ￿0:1;a2 = 0:328;￿0 = 0:049, ￿1 = 0:01
Hate Variety ￿ = 1;a2 = 0:255;￿0 = 0:049, ￿1 = 0:01
High Markup ￿ = 2=3;￿ = 0:393
No Cost a2 = 0:315
Sunk a2 = 0:348 ;￿0 = 0:16, ￿1 = 0:052
CRS ￿ = 1=3;a2 = 0:322, ￿0 = 0:16, ￿1 = 0:052
High Armington ￿ = ￿ = 2=3
No Cost a2 = 0:561
Sunk-CRS ￿ = 1=3;a2 = 0:589;￿0 = 0:16;￿1 = 0:052
Annual M11 = 0:954, ￿2
￿ = 0:02422, ￿￿ = 0:25, ￿ = 0:96,
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